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NOTE
Living Wills in the United States and Canada:
A Comparative Analysis
"Vex not his ghost. 0, let him pass! He hates him that would upon
the rack of this tough world stretch him out longer." 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, modem medical technology has made it possi-
ble, and society has made it acceptable, to keep patients "alive" longer
and longer. Some believe that patients are frequently kept alive "beyond
the point dictated by humane medical practice."2 Others state that pa-
tients remaining on life support systems become, in a sense, "prisoners of
medical technology." 3 In its most basic sense, technological advance-
ment has changed the treatment of illness and injury. Scientific research
has helped us to maintain heartbeat, breathing, and nutritionally sup-
plied bodily activities long after the brain ceases to function. Today, an
estimated eighty percent of all deaths occur in an institutional setting.4
Although the definition of legal death is a point of contention among
both medical and legal scholars, the majority of jurisdictions now point
to "brain death" as the pivotal point in the analysis.5 "Brain dead" per-
I William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Lear, in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE COM-
PLETE WORKS 923 (Stanely Wells et al. eds., 1986).
2 NORMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING ix (1987).
3 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988). In an amicus brief, the American Academy
of Neurology referred to Ms. Cruzan as a "prisoner of medical technology." Id. at 423 n.19.
4 Christopher J. Condie, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 105, 105 (1988); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-Sus-
TAINING TREATMENT 17 (1983).
5 The controversy surrounds the point at which brain death actually renders the patient dead.
For a discussion of this ambiguity, see generally Stuart Youngner, 'Brain Death' and Organ Re-
trieval A Cross-Sectional Survey of Knowledge and Concepts Among Health Professionals 261 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2205 (1989). The article points out that irreversible loss of all brain function is required
for a patient to be declared brain dead, while irreversible loss of all cortical function alone does not
render the individual legally dead. Id. at 2208. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
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sons may now be kept alive through the use of artificial means for a
number of years.6
As technology changes the face of medical treatment, many people
realize that they do not want to be kept alive by artificial means. Many
factors may go into the decision to request a natural death; thereby re-
questing that caregivers and family members be instructed to withhold
life-sustaining procedures. Living wills serve the purpose of articulating
and publicizing this decision. The living will has been defined as "[a]
directive to [one's] family and physician acknowledging [his or her] pref-
erence for a dignified death as opposed to an artificial or mechanical pro-
longation of life when no hope of recovery remains." 7 In directing
instructions to the physician, a living will indemnifies the physician
against malpractice liability should he comply with its demands.8 On an
emotional level a living will offers comfort to the patient's family by as-
suring family members that the patient's desires will be met. Although
problems of ambiguity and inconsistency of interpretation do arise, and
the implementation of advance directives under living wills can be emo-
tionally charged, living wills clearly serve several fundamental purposes.
The creation of a living will provides an opportunity for the commence-
ment of open communication between the patient, his family, and the
attending physician. Because death is often a difficult and emotionally
weighted topic of conversation, this communication allows those in-
volved to calm their anxieties and to discuss possible alternatives at
length. Most of us fear death. We have a tendency to repress this fright-
ening subject. That fear of our own death may cause this repression is
obvious, but we must remember that adults may also suppress thoughts
of their parents' death; thereby avoiding the issue of their own mortality.
Once the lines of communication are opened, living wills provide a
clear and documented testimonial of the patient's decision. No ambigui-
ties or controversies in opinion as to what the patient actually decided
will occur if the patient employs adequately precise language. Stress sur-
rounding a life-threatening illness can be reduced if these issues are at-
tacked and resolved before critical decisions must be made in the face of
an emergency.
Courts and state legislatures throughout the United States have be-
gun to recognize the benefits of decision-making by proxy and through
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDECINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH,
(1981) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 1981].
6 Condie, supra note 4, at 105.
7 Shari Lobe, The Will to Die: Survey of State Living Will Legislation and Case Law, 9 PRO-
BATE L. J. 47 (1989), quoted in Parks H. Wilson Jr., The Living Will-Death with Dignity or
Mechanical Vitality, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 163, 164 (1979).
8 See generally Lobe, supra note 7.
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the mechanism of living wills. Canada's reaction has not been quite as
accepting. This note will first outline the present status of living wills in
the United States. In doing so, characteristic state legislation will be in-
vestigated, as well as relevant case law. Next, the status of living wills in
Canada will be analyzed. Comparisons between the two countries will
ultimately be drawn. Evidence that Canada, in effect, follows U.S. prece-
dent will be set forth and discussed. Also, the various factors influencing
the effectiveness of living wills will be articulated: both pros and cons of
their acceptance will be recognized. As a way of conclusion, this note
will recommend that Canada follow the example set by the United
States, which has adopted specific legislation vital in the treatment of
living wills.
II. WHY THIS COMPARISON?
The topic of living wills has been in the forefront of U.S. social and
political arenas for the past several years. The states vary greatly regard-
ing their acceptance of advance directives. The issues, however, continue
to be openly debated. The controversy is recognized as having far-reach-
ing consequences; it raises both the issue of constitutionally mandated
privacy rights and the issue of states' interest in preserving human life.
Medical experts and emotionally charged families aside, the controversy
concerning whether to allow an individual to make the decision to termi-
nate life-support systems becomes quite political. No clear and unani-
mous decision has yet been reached, but there is a growing trend in favor
of continued support and reinforcement for advance directives.
The questions in Canada are quite different for several reasons.
Constitutional issues do not play such a symbolic and intensely political
role in the Canadian arena. Additionally, health care in Canada is char-
acteristically more socialized.9 Thus the question remains whether a
consensus on the topic of living wills is imperative in Canada. Although
Canadians struggle with the issues of the right to natural death and the
right to make an unencumbered decision about the fate of one's body in
an unconscious and terminally ill situation, authority regarding these is-
sues is yet undeveloped in the Canadian context. Because Canadian
provinces have yet to deal overtly with these issues, Canada is a true
tabula rasa in the area of living wills laws. In effect, those involved in
health care decisions for the terminally ill now follow the U.S. model. So
Canada's proximity to the United States cannot be ignored. Canada can
and does look over our mutual border and gathers guidance from our
political and judicial infrastructure. The United States is not a quiet,
introverted neighbor. In facing these dilemmas, we are loud and aggres-
9 See generally LORNE E. ROzovsKY, THE CANADIAN PATIENT'S BOOK OF RIGHTS (1980)
(see particularly Chapter 2 which discusses hospital insurance and medicare).
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sive, often oscillating between sides as political interest groups rally for
support and ultimate victory on the issues. Canada's temptation to imi-
tate our model is thus extreme. One illustration of this temptation is the
fact that Canada has adopted our approach to living wills laws.
Thus, in the area of living will laws, Canada has subtly adopted a
system identical to that developed in the United States. It has done so
even though it does not, on its own, have any statutory or common law
authority on point. Physicians, health care practitioners, and even
judges have been silently persuaded that the U.S. response is valid and
should be followed. Where Canada lacks consensus on the topic of living
wills, it takes American precedent as its own.
This practice by Canada is unsafe. Canada should ensure that the
framework it sets into place remains stable; thereby granting to physi-
cians and family alike the freedom to follow advance directives without
fear of liability or emotional repercussions. The first step is to adopt pro-
vincial legislation recognizing the validity of living wills. This step is rec-
ommended to guard against the unfortunate possibility that the system
implemented in the United States is suddenly destroyed. The American
response, although impressive, is still tenuous, and Canada should begin
building its own guidelines to which those faced with the controversy can
look for concrete answers.
III. STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Statutory Response
Louis Kutner first proposed the living will concept in the 1930's.tO
A few decades later, a New York educational institution known as "Con-
cern for Dying" began to produce and distribute living will forms."1 In
1976, California was the first state to enact a statute recognizing the va-
lidity of living wills.'" Between 1976 and 1979, ten states adopted similar
legislation. 3 The period from 1981 to 1984 saw twelve additional states
and the District of Columbia adopt Natural Death Acts.'4 But between
1985 and 1986 there was "an acceleration in lawmaking that exceeded
any other period in the history of 'living will' legislation."' 5 Sixteen
10 PHIL WILLIAMS, THE LIVING WILL SOURCE BOOK 7 (1986); Condie, supra note 4, at 105.
11 WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 7. The wills were distributed primarily in 1968.
12 Lobe, supra note 7, at 47.
13 SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS 5 (1987) [hereinafter
SOCIETY HANDBOOK]. States included: Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas and Washington. Id.
14 States included: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ver-
mont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id. See also HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL
LAWS (1981-84) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
15 SOCIETY HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 5.
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states enacted statutes within sixteen months.16 A common purpose of
these statutes was to "recognize the right of an adult person to make a
written directive instructing his physician to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition."17
At present, forty-five states and the District of Columbia have appli-
cable legislation."8 Although the format of these statutes varies signifi-
cantly from state to state, there are some elements common to all of
them.19 In addition, various states have chosen differing titles for these
Statutes.
20
A Durable Power of Attorney was often a major element of these
living wills laws as they began to develop. In a Durable Power of Attor-
ney situation, a proxy is designated to make any and all decisions for the
patient once he becomes incompetent. Given general instructions by the
patient, the proxy is afforded broad authority in making medical deci-
sions. Establishing the authority of a proxy is the next best scenario to
acceptance of living wills - while a living will instructs medical person-
nel to implement the patient's instructions directly, a proxy is given au-
thority to act on behalf of the patient generally to implement the
patient's wishes. As of August 31, 1991, forty-eight states have included
provisions providing specific power of attorney decision-making
16 Id. States included: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Utah. Id
17 BARNEY SNEIDERMAN ET AL., CANADIAN MEDICAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION FOR PHY-
SICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 314 (1989). The statutes enable a mentally
competent adult to anticipate a state of incompetency during terminal illness, and should that situa-
tion arise, exercise control over his own medical decisions. Id.
Is These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Note that eleven states have enacted statutes substantially similar to the Uniform Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act (of 1985 and amended in 1989). These states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Iowa,
Miane, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. UNIF.
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 96, 116 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter UNIFORM
RIGHTS ACT].
19 See discussion of the elements of living wills, infra notes 40-112 and accompanying text. For
a general comparative overview see SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
LEGISLATION: A STATE BY STATE COMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES (1991).
20 California's statute, for example, is entitled "Natural Death Act." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7185 (West Supp. 1992). Arizona's statute is entitled the "Medical Treatment Decision
Act." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, ch. 32 (Supp. 1991). Some are more direct, having been
entitled, for example, "Removal of Life Support Systems," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 19a, ch.
368w (West Supp. 1991), while others portend the action, such as the "Right to Decline Life-Pro-
longing Procedures Act." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765 (Supp. 1992).
19921
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procedures.21
In general, living will legislation provides the following items: (1)
21 There are several different types of health care power of attorney statutes including: (1) those
specifically designed for the purpose of authorizing the appointment of an agent for health care
decision making; (2) general durable power of attorney statutes containing a provision expressly
permitting the designation of an agent to make health care decisions; (3) provisions of living will or
surrogate decision making statutes permitting the appointment of an agent to make health care
decisions; and (4) general durable power of attorney statutes which, although not mentioning health
care decision making, have been judicially construed to permit the appointment of an agent to make
health care decisions or may be used to appoint an agent for that purpose because another statute
(such as a living will statute or surrogate decision making statute) specifically authorizes such use.
ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 217 (Supp. 1992). A combination of these includes: ALASKA
STAT. §§ 13.26.356 (Supp. 1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204.B (Supp. 1991); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-5501 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-202(b) (Michie 1991); CAL CIV. CODE
§§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-501 to 502 (Supp. 1991); 1991 Conn.
Legis. Serv. Pub. Act 91-283 (S.H.B. 7184) (West, June 26, 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 2502(b) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2201 to 2213 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 641.61-.72
(West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.04(l)
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-26 (Supp.
1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 to 4509 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras. 804-1 to -
12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-6 (Bums 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 144B.1-.12 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.705 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.71
(West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 to -632 (Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.970-
.986 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2997 (West Supp. 1991): LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.58; 3(C)(1) (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-501 (West Supp.
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-702(c) (West Supp. 1991); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 13-601 to -602 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (West Supp. 1992);
MICH. COM. LAWS § 700.496 (Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN § 145B.06.2 (West Supp. 1991);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-151 to -183 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.800 -.865 (Vernon Supp.
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(1) (1987), amended by 1991 Mont. Laws ch. 391 (H.B. 635)
(Apr.8, 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-501 to-502 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 449.800 -.860
(Michie Supp. 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.540 -.690 (Michie 1987), amended by 1991
Nev. Stat. ch. 258 §§ 6, 27 (S.B. 442)(June 6, 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:1 -16 (Supp
1991); 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 201 (S.B. 1211) (West, July 11, 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46;2B-8 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-501 to 502 (Michie 1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2980-2994 (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-1 to -2 (1987); 1991 N.D.
Laws 266, §§ 1-18; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 -. 17 (Anderson Supp. 1990), amended by
1991 Ohio Laws File 36 (S.B. 1) (July 11, 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.505 -.585 (1991); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5601-5606 (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -2 (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 62-5-501 to -502 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991), amended by 1991 S.C. Acts 149, 5 (H.B. 3090) (June 12, 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to -2.8 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-201 to -214 (Supp. 1991),
amended by 1991 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 344 (H.B. 956) (May 14, 1991); TEx. PROB. ANN. art. 36A
(West 1992); UTAH C6DE ANN. § 75-2-1106 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467
(Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2984 (Michie 1990); VA. CODE ANN § 54.1-2986 (Michie
1991); VA. CODE ANN § 37.1-134.4D (Michie 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9.1 to -9.4 (Michie
1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.94.010 -.040 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30A-1
to -20 (1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01 -.80 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. §§ 3-5-201 to -214
(1991), amended by 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws 80; Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102(d) (1991).
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recognition of an adult individual's advance directive;22 (2) immunity
from liability for medical practitioners honoring directives; (3) a sug-
gested form of declaration;23 (4) definition of terms;24 (5) procedures for
execution of declarations;2" (6) a provision outlining an unlimited term of
effectiveness; 2 6 (7) a requirement that declaration be made part of the
medical record; (8) a requirement that physicians who are unwilling or
unable to honor declaration make a reasonable effort to transfer the pa-
tient;27 and (9) a declaration that nothing in the statute impairs or super-
sedes other rights or responsibilities.28
In an attempt to make state laws uniform in purpose and form, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws enacted
its Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act in 1985.29 The Act, which
focuses on patient autonomy, suggests a simple form outlining the pa-
tient's desires and loosens restrictions concerning witnesses. As origi-
nally drafted, the Act lacked two significant provisions, one allowing for
the appointment of a proxy and one providing procedures to be followed
in the event that the patient has no declaration or has not appointed a
proxy.30 Since its inception, however, the Act has added these two provi-
sions. 31 The Uniform Act is significant because it reveals support for
living wills among politicians and decision-makers.32
22 SocIETY HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 15. Note that only an adult, and not a minor, may
execute an advance directive.
23 Id. In most states, the form can be varied with personal directions.
24 Terms such as "life-sustaining procedure" and "terminal condition" are defined. Misunder-
standings frequently arise, however, because the definitions are ambiguous. Id.
25 Id. These include witnessing procedures and requirements for revocation. Note that the
revocation rules, for the most part, are easily met.
26 California recently amended its statute to allow for this unlimited term. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1992).
27 SocIETY HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 16. This provision, in some states, includes a pen-
alty for violation of the transfer requirement. Id.
28 This clarifies that a statutory declaration is one easily effectuated way of exercising rights but
is not the exclusive method. Id.
29 See generally, UNIFORM RIGHTS AcT supra note 18.
30 UNIFORM RIGHTs ACT, supra note 18. When a patient becomes incompetent and has not
created a living will or appointed a proxy, guidelines for medical decision-making are crucial. Vary-
ing standards make decisions in this scenario difficult and time consuming. It is in these situations,
too, where speedy and concise decisions must be reached. Often the patient is in severe pain, or his
condition is costing a great deal in medical bills - both of which are factors warranting quick
resolution of the issue of whether or not to continue life-sustaining measures.
31 The provision allowing for appointment of a proxy can be found at UNIFORM RIGHTS ACT,
supra note 18, § 2. The provision establishing procedures to be followed in the absence of a declara-
tion can be found at UNIFORM RIGHTS AcT, supra note 18, § 7.
32 The Uniform Laws are compiled by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, which was organized in 1892. The Conference is made up of Commissioners from each
state, who in most cases are appointed by the governor or by the legislature. The membership is
primarily lawyers, judges, legislators, and law school professors. 9B U.L.A. III (1987).
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Despite criticism of the variety of statutes which have been enacted,
support for living will legislation is widespread. One author notes that
"millions of people have already signed some kind of living will."33 In a
1986 poll taken for the American Medical Association, 1,100 out of
1,500 people said they favored "withdrawing life-support systems, in-
cluding food and water, from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comatose pa-
tients if they or their families request it."'34 Further, a poll taken after
following a nationally televised conference, moderated by Ted Koppel,
on, "Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides?" found that:
[t]he American people want to have uniform living will provisions in
every state, durable power of attorney provisions in every state, and an
ongoing national public education program in place to make the public
aware of the nature and availability of these documents.35
But some feel that living wills are limited and evanescent.3 6 Profes-
sor Leslie Francis explains that living wills, like testamentary wills, are
plagued with ambiguities. Although she does not specify what kinds of
ambiguities, she may be referring to such things as formalities which are
inflexible and thus can be confusing in situations where detailed interpre-
tation is required. Francis states that living wills are not "performa-
tive,"' 37 and concludes that the "current treatment of living wills assures
only relatively limited and fragile changes in the medical treatment of an
individual."3
Although reaction is divided, the fact remains that forty-five states
and the District of Columbia have now enacted some sort of Natural
Death Act, Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, or "living will" legislation.39
1. Who May Execute a Living Will?
The person executing a living will, or similar statutorily recognized
advance directive, must be a competent adult.4 This means that the
adult must be alert and aware (of sound mind and body) at the time the
declaration is made.41 Further, competency implicitely means that the
33 Condie, supra note 4, at 105.
34 SOCIETY HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 13.
35 Id. Note that a later survey illustrates less convincing statistics. In a 1989 poll, 9% of
Americans were said to execute advance directives. See MEISEL, supra note 21, citing Emanuel &
Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document 261 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 3288 (1989).
36 Leslie P. Francis, The Evanescence of Living Wills, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 27, 50 (1988).
37 Id. at 30. There is no dictionary definition of the word "performative." In the context of
her analysis, "performative" seems to mean that living wills "change very little." Id.
38 Id. at 27.
39 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
40 Lobe, supra note 7, at 48. See also Condie, supra note 4, at 108.
41 This is an extremely strict standard. If the declarant is incompetent at the time the living
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individual is able to make significant decisions such as whether or not he
wishes to be kept on life-sustaining measures. In addition, the individual
must understand the consequences of those decisions; he must be aware
that death is ultimately involved. The statutes generally define "compe-
tent person" as "an individual who is able to understand and appreciate
the nature and consequences of a decision to accept or refuse treat-
ment,"t42 or a person "possessing the ability, based on reasonable medical
judgment, to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
a treatment decision, including the significant benefits and harms of and
reasonable alternatives to a purposed treatment decision."' 43 In the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is in favor of compe-
tency.' In most jurisdictions, the individual making a living will must
be terminally ill (whether by reason of disease or injury).45 Ambiguity
arises here, however, because most states fail to define what constitutes
"terminal illness." 46 Despite the lack of clear definition, twenty-five
will is executed, or if there is a question concerning his competence at that time, the advance direc-
tive will be invalidated.
42 See, eg., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-103(1) (Supp. 1991).
43 See, e.g., Tax. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.002(2) (West 1992).
44 Lobe, supra note 7, at 48.
45 Condie, supra note 4, at 111. See also, Lobe, supra note 7, at 60-61. Lobe notes that to be
qualified to execute a living will, a patient must be afflicted with a "terminal condition." Id. Arkan-
sas is the only state which does not require that the patient's illness or injury be terminal. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-17-201(7) (Michie 1991). See also Condie, supra note 4, at 111 n.43.
Those statutes requiring that the patient be terminally ill include: ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(5)
(1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(5) (Supp. 1991); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186(h) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104 (1991);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(5) (West Supp.
1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(a) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421(5) (1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-32-3(a) (Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-3(a) (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4503(2) (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.3 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65.28,101 & 65.28,102(e) (1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.624 (7) (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(8) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701(7) (West Supp.
1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601(f) (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.03. Subd. 1
& 145B.04 (West Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-105 & 41-41-107 (1991); MO. ANN.
STAT. §§ 459.010.-459.015 (Vernon Supp. 1992); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 449.600, 449.610 (1987);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2v (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (Michie 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 3102(7) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.605(5) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to
44-77-20(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-1(7) (Supp. 1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-103(1), 32-11-104 & 32-11-105 (Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 672.002(8) (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1103(3) & 75-2-1104(4) (Supp
1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5253 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Michie 1991); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(6)-(8) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-35-2 & 16-30-3 (Supp.
1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(6) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101(a)(v) (Supp. 1991).
46 Condie, supra note 4, at 111-112 n.43-44; Lobe, supra note 7, at 60. Several states define
terminal condition as one which would produce death despite the application of life-sustaining pro-
cedures. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-570(3) (West Supp. 1992) (defining terminal condition as
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states require that the attending physician certify in writing that the pa-
tient's condition is terminal.47 Many states further require that this certi-
fication be verified by another physician.48
Minors present a different problem, as the varying treatment of mi-
the final stage of an incurable or irreversible medical condition, which, in the opinion of the attend-
ing physician, will result in death); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501(e) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2421(6) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(6) (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(10)
(Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 702(h)
(Smith-Hurd Supp 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.624(8) (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(10) (West Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601(g) (1990);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-2 (Michie Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.02 subd. 8 (West Supp.
1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107 (1) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.590 (1987); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.605(6) (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(9) (Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1103(7) (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5252(5) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-
2982 & 54.1-2984 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(7) (West 1992); W.VA.
CODE § 16-30-2(10) (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (West 1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-
101 (a)(vi) (Supp 1991). This definition severly limits the group of terminally ill patients able to
qualify under these statutes. UNIFORM RIGHTS ACT, supra note 18, § 1(9).
Other jurisdicitions, however, define a terminal condition as one in which death will result if no
life-sustaining measures are used. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.100(7) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
201(9) (Michie 1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(6) (Supp. 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7186(j) (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(10) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327D-2 (Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-9 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(8)
(West 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-701(9) (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 459.010(6) (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102(14) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.4.02(7) (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(8) (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-77-20(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-1(8) (Supp. 1991);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.002(9) (West 1992).
47 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-6 (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(A) (Supp. 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(9) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2421(6) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.03(5) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
para. 702(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14 (West 1992); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65.28.105 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.7 (West 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 5-604(a) (1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:2V (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-7-5A (Michie 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102
7 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-105 (Supp 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 672.002(8) (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104(4) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2984 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(6) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-
5(a) (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(6) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-101(a)(v) (Supp.
1991).
48 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(5) (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (Supp. 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(9) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN § 6-2421(5) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.03(5) (West Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137-H:2V (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-5A (Michie 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-
03 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(7) (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610
(1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 672.002(8) (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104(4) (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2982 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(6) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-30-2(10) (Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(6) (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-
101(a)(v) (Supp. 1991).
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nors among states creates ambiguity. Only five states currently allow
minors to make a living will declaration or allow their legal guardian to
do so on their behalf.4 9 Aside from the minor, certain individuals (par-
ent, legal guardian, spouse if he/she has reached the age of majority) are
authorized by these statutes to execute the living will on the minor's
behalf.50
Louisiana and New Mexico, further, deem a living will invalid if
executed by the minor's parent or guardian if it is opposed by the minor's
other parent, guardian, or adult spouse."1 In an effort to ensure that
those involved in a decision to terminate a minor's life-sustaining treat-
ment are acting in good faith, Maryland and New Mexico have added the
requirement that a living will executed on behalf of a minor must be
certified by a district court judge in order to be valid.52
Most state statutes have special provisions addressing the issue of
whether or not a pregnant woman can execute a valid living will.53 A
pregnant woman can execute a living will, but these provisions deem the
declaration invalid during her pregnancy. 54 Some statutes, for example,
49 Condie, supra note 4, at 108. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6 (West Supp. 1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2967 (McKinney Supp. 1992);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320 (1987) (statute simply identifies the declarant as a "person"); TEX.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.006 (West 1992).
50 See, eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6 (West Supp. 1987).
51 Lobe, supra note 7, at 49 n.20; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6(B)(2) (West Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4 (Supp. 1986).
52 See, eg., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4
(Michie Supp. 1986). See also Lobe, supra note 7, at 50.
53 See generally Janice MacAvoy-Smitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1280 (1987). States include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
54 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3205D (Supp 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Michie 1991) (declaration is not
given effect if patient is pregnant as long as it is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of
live birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7189.5(c) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (1991) (limited as in Arkan-
sas); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-574 (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(d)
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.08 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (Michie 1991);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-6 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703(c) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1991) (the declaration will have no effect as long as, in the opinion of the attending physician,
it is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with the continued application of
death-delaying procedures); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-11(d) (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.6 (West 1989) (limited as in Arkansas); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65.28.103 (1991); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.624(7)(b) (Baldwin 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE § 5-605(2) (1990); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(1) (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (1991) (limited as in Arkan-
sas); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-10 (Supp. 1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.004
19921
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remove the status of "qualified patient" in the event the patient discovers
that she is pregnant.55 Others simply state that the living will form is
completely ineffective during the course of the pregnancy. 6 The main
issue is whether or not the child could be delivered while the mother was
maintained on a life support system. A states' interest in preserving
human life (that of the unborn child) is in direct conflict with the wo-
man's right to force physicians to comply with her living will. If the
woman is removed from life support equipment during pregnancy, her
baby will most likely die. She will argue that it is her right to make a
living will, and that it should be enforced despite her pregnancy.5 7
Meanwhile, the state will argue that the woman, while being able to
make decisions concerning the disposition of her body, cannot interfere
with the well-established state interest in preserving human life. The re-
lated Constitutional arguments regarding a woman's right of privacy
have raised a great deal of controversy. 58 Statutory provisions disallow-
ing the advance directives of pregnant women, thus, will continue to be
hotly debated.
2. Execution Formalities
All living will statutes require some degree of formality in execu-
tion.5 9 Some formalities are similar to those required for execution of
testamentary documents, 6° while others have more detailed instruc-
tions. 61 Six states allow oral declarations. 62 The remaining states require
that the declaration be in writing.63 Further, the living will must be exe-
(West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030
(West 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102(b) (Supp. 1991).
55 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5(c) (West Supp 1992).
56 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D-6 (Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987).
57 See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (involving substituted judgment and a preg-
nant woman's right to refuse treatment). See also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
58 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting the right to privacy
in the confines of the marital bedroom); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a
Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(allowing a woman the right to have an abortion in the first trimester without state intrusion).
59 See UNIFORM RIGHTS Acr, supra note 18, § 2.
60 Lobe, supra note 7, at 51.
61 Id.
62 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.04(1) (West 1986) (oral declaration must be subscribed by witness in
declarant's presence); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571(4) (West Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(4) (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145 B.03 subd. 2(c) (West Supp.
1992) (the declaration must be communicated to and then transcribed by one of the witnesses); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.005 (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983 (1991) (two
witnesses and the physician must be present).
63 Condie, supra note 4, at 113.
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cuted "willfully and voluntarily;" it must also be signed, dated and wit-
nessed.64 The witnessing requirements vary. In Virginia, an attending
physician must be present.6 Other statutes specifically disqualify certain
persons from serving as witnesses. Many statutes require that the wit-
ness have no interest in the declarant's estate or not be financially respon-
sible for the patient's medical costs.6 6 Others prohibit the attending
physician or health care providers employed where the patient is being
treated from acting as witnesses.67 Five states prohibit any other patient
in the same facility as the declarant from serving as a witness.68 In
North Dakota, if the declarant is a resident of a long-term health care
facility at the time the declaration is executed, one of the two witnesses
must be a recognized member of the clergy, an attorney licensed to prac-
tice in the state, or a person as may be designated by the department of
human services or the county court.6 9 These witness requirements at-
tempt to safeguard against duress or coercion by those with specific inter-
6Id.
65 VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983 (Michie 1991).
66 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202 (Supp 1991); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186.5(a) (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-105 (1991);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 16, § 2503(b)(2)-(3) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422(4)(C)(D) (1984); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(2) & (4)-(5) (Michie 1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-3(b) (Supp. 1991); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-11-11-11(c)(3)-
(4) (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65.28, 103 (1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE § 5-602(a)(4)
(1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.03 Subdiv. 2(d) (West Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
107(1) (1991); NEv. REV. STAT. § 449.600(4) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-77-40(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104 (Supp. 1991); TEx.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.003(c) (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 18, § 5254 (West
1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(b)(3)-(4)
(Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-102(a) (Supp. 1991).
67 Colorado excludes any physician, as well as health care providers employed at the facility
where the declarant is a patient. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-105(1)(a)-(b) (1991); See also CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186.5(a) (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 16, § 2503(b)(5)
(1983) (excluding all employees of the health care facility where in declarant is a patient); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2422(c) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(3) (Michie 1991); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 327-D-3(4)(C) (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1991) (excluding any health care
provider); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107 (1) (1991); NEv. REv. STAT. § 449.600 2 (1987); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:4 (Supp 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3) (1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-06.4-03 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 127.610 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-40(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 32-11-104 (Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.003(3)-(5) (West 1992);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104(4) (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5254 (1991); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(b)(5) (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 154.03 (West 1989).
68 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3) (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103 (West Supp.
1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.610 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-40(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.003(6) (West 1992).
69 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-03 (1991).
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ests or biases.7 ° Several states also require notarization as an additional
formality.7 Many also impose a duty on the declarant to notify his or
her physician of the document's existence; the physician is then directed
to make it part of the patient's medical records. 72 Hawaii, New Hamp-
shire and Vermont require that anyone possessing the living will of an-
other deliver the will to the declarant's physician - if that person is
aware that the patient is in a condition where the living will could poten-
tially be applied.73 While all statutes provide a sample form of a living
will, only two states dictates that it must be followed exactly.74 Many
states, however, have only a general form.75 Unfortunately, this provides
a possibility for ambiguity, misunderstanding and failure to adequately
interpret the declarant's intentions.
3. Definition Section
All state living will statutes contain definition sections. 76 The defini-
tions common to most statutes include: "attending physician; '77 "decla-
ration; ' 78  "health care provider;"' 79  "life-sustaining procedure;" 80
"physician;"81 "qualified patient;"'8 2 and "terminally ill or injured pa-
tient.",8 3 Although these definitions are necessary, they create problems
of ambiguity. For example, some statutes prohibit the withdrawal or
70 See Lobe, supra note 7, at 54-56. See also Condie, supra note 4, at 113-114.
71 Lobe, supra note 7, at 57.
72 Id. Note that in Mississippi, the declarant, rather than notifying the physician, must file the
living will with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Board of Health. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-
41-107 (Supp. 1988).
73 HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-9 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:8 (Supp. 1991);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5258 (1991).
74 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (1989). California requires
only substantial compliance with the sample form. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186.5 (West
Supp. 1992).
75 See UNIFORM RIGHTS AcT, supra note 18, § 2.
76 Condie, supra note 4, at 114.
77 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(1) (1990).
78 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(2)(1990).
79 "A person who is licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized by the law of this state to
administer health care in the ordinary course of business or practice of a profession." CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 7186(c) (West Supp. 1992).
80 "Any medical procedure or intervention which, when applied to a qualified patient, would
serve only to prolong the dying process." ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(3) (1990).
81 "A person licensed to practice medicine and osteopathy in the state .... ALA. CODE § 22-
8A-3(4) (1990).
82 "A patient, who has executed a declaration in accordance with this chapter and who has
been diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by two physicians
who have personally examined the patient, one of whom shall be the attending physician." ALA.
CODE § 22-8A-3(5) (1990).
83 "A patient whose death is imminent or whose condition is hopeless unless he or she is artifi-
cially supported through the use of life-sustaining procedures." ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(6) (1990).
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withholding of treatment for "comfort or care to alleviate pain."' 84 Here,
nutrition and hydration are specifically included in the description of
comfort care or care to aleviate pain. Other statutes are not quite as
clear: they leave operative questions of whether "comfort care" or "care
to alleviate pain" include nutrition and/or hydration.85 A second ques-
tion which arises is whether some procedures utilized to prolong life are
actually painful or discomforting.86 Another defined term that often
presents ambiguity is that of "terminally ill or injured patient. ' 87  Some
statutes use the words "imminent" or "hopeless. ' 88  But in applying
these provisions, one encounters difficulties in determining what "immi-
84 See, eg., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 5-706(b) (West Supp. 1991) "This part does not
affect the responsibility of the attending physician or other health-care providers to provide treat-
ment, including nutrition and hydration, for a patient's comfort care or alleviation of pain." Id.
The Maine statute, in its Comment on the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, states:
The Act uses the term "comfort care" in defining procedures that may be applied notwith-
standing a declaration instructing withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment.
The purpose for permitting continuation of life-sustaining treatment deemed necessary for
comfort care or alleviation of pain is to allow the physician to take appropriate steps to
insure comfort and freedom from pain, as dictated by reasonable medical standards. Many
existing statutes employ the term "comfort care" in connection with the alleviation of pain,
and the Act follows this example. Although the phrase "to alleviate pain" arguably is
subsumed within the term "comfort care", the additional specificity was considered helpful
for both the doctor and the lay-person.
Id.
85 Condie, supra note 4, at 115. The Maine statute on point states the following:
[The section regarding comfort care or alleviation of pain] does not set out a separate rule
governing the provision of nutrition and hydration. Instead, each is subject to the same
considerations of necessity for comfort care and alleviation of pain as are all other forms of
life-sustaining treatment. If nutrition and hydration are not necessary for comfort care or
alleviation of pain, they may be withdrawn. This approach was deemed preferable to the
approach in a few existing statutes, which treat nutirition and hydration as comfort care in
all cases, regardless of circumstances, and exclude comfort care from the life-sustaining
treatment definition.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-a, § 7-706 (West Supp. 1991) (Uniform Rights Act comment). The
Maine statute goes on to state:
It is debatable whether physicians or other professionals perceive the providing of nourish-
ment through intravenous feeding apparatus or agastric tubes as comfort care in all cases
or whether such procedures at times merely prolong the dying process. Whether proce-
dures to provide nourishment should be considered life-sustaining treatment or comfort
care appears to depend on the factual circumstances of each case and, therefore, such deci-
sions should be left to the physician, exercising reasonable medical judgment. Declarants
may, however, specifically express their views regarding continuation or noncontinuation
of such procedures in the declaration, and those views will control.
Id.
86 Condie, supra note 4, at 115.
87 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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nent" or "hopeless" means. 89
Acknowledging that ambiguities exist is a vital step in the process of
employing these living will provisions. Declarants who wish to make
their intentions clear have been urged by an organization called "Choice
in Dying" to go a step further and define terms fully on their own."
"Choice in Dying" is a nonprofit organization, based in New York,
which seeks to educate people regarding their rights to make informed
decisions about death and dying. 9 1
4. Revocation Procedures
The duration of living wills under most state statutes is unlimited.92
All states except Connecticut provide that a declaration may be revoked
at any time.9 3 Although differences exist in the required revocation pro-
cedures, most require that a declarant revoke by executing a written doc-
ument, by physical destruction of the living will, or by a verbal or non-
verbal communication, indicating intent to revoke.9 These require-
ments, as with the formal requirements of execution, closely parallel the
standards for revocation of a testamentary document. 95
5. Noncompliance
Although a majority of the states provide that living will statutes do
not impose liability on the physician for failure to comply with a quali-
fied patient's declaration,96 thirty nine (of the forty-six jurisdictions) re-
quire that the physician refusing to comply transfer the patient to
89 Due to this ambiguity,the drafters of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act use "rela-
tively short time" rather than "imminent." 9B U.L.A. §§ 1-18 (1989)
90 See HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 7 (suggesting that the declarant (in those states requiring
only that the form be "substantially" followed) add personal instructions).
91 Note that initially, this organization was called "The Society for the Right to Die." In 1992,
however, it changed its legal name to "Choice in Dying" when "The Society for the Right to Die"
and "Concern for Dying" merged. Telephone converstion with representative of "Choice in Dying"
(Apr. 24, 1992).
92 Only one state, Georgia, currently has an automatic revocation provision. GA. CODE. ANN.
§ 31-32-6(a)-(b) (Michie 1991) (providing that living wills executed on or after March 28, 1986, shall
be of unlimited duration unless revoked under its statutory procedures but that those executed prior
to that date will be effective only for a period of seven years).
93 Lobe, supra note 7, at 58. See also Condie, supra note 4, at 116.
94 Lobe, supra note 7, at 58. Note that in Alabama, D.C., Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah,
West Virgina and Wyoming, a witness to an oral revocation must sign a written statement confirm-
ing that the revocation was made. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5(3) (1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2424(a)(3) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65.28, 104(3) (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3104 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1111(l)(c) (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(3) (Supp. 1991); Wyo. STAT. § 35-
22-103 (1988).
95 See generally U.P.C. § 2-507.
96 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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another physician who will. 97 Several states do not require a physician to
abide by a patient's declaration.98 In a sense, this undermines the decla-
ration's effectiveness. Twelve states and the District of Columbia, how-
ever, assess penalties to physicians who do not comply with valid
declarations.99 Typical penalties for non-compliance include: withhold-
97 Condie, supra note 4, at 118. In many states the transfer requirement is also imposed if
hospital or health care facility policy precludes the removal of support systems. Id. See, eg., ALA.
CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.050 (1991); Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204
(Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-207 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190
(West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113(5) (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-24-27(b) (1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a (West date); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09 (West Supp. 1992); GA
CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b)(1) (Michie 1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 327D-11 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO
CODE § 39-4508 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 706 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (if
unable to do so, physician must notify individuals by priority listing); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11(e)
(West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.8 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65.28, 107 (1991); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.634(1) (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.7 B (West
1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-708 (West Supp. 1991); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE § 5-
604(b) (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West Supp. 1992) (puts duty on declarant first to seek
alternate care); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-115(2) (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.030 (Vernon Supp.
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (1991); NEv. REv. STAT. § 449.700 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 137-H:6 (Supp. 1991) (if physician cannot comply with the declaration, he must notify the
patient and family and then the patient may request to be referred to another physician); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-08 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-5B (Michie 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 3107 (West Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.625(3) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-
100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-11 (Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-11-108 (Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(2) (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 5256 (Michie 1991) (physician has duty to inform the patient that he cannot comply and to
help the patient find a new physician); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.060(2) (West 1992); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(b) (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 154.07(c) (West 1989).
98 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (1990) (physician refusing to comply shall not be liable for his
refusal); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204 C (Supp. 1991) (attending physician is not required to
comply with a declaration if to do so is contrary to the physician's religious beliefs or sincerely held
moral convictions); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765 et seq. (West Supp. 1992) (statute has no penalties); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b) (Michie
1991) (no person shall be civilly liable for failure to comply); IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 (Supp. 1991);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 706 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (physicians' responsibilities stated
in the affirmative, but penalties apply); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14(f) (West 1992); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-115(2) (1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.9 (West 1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.634(2) (Baldwin 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.640 (1987) (physician may consider other
factors); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 137.H:6 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-5B (Michie 1991); OR. REV.
STAT. § 127.625(1) (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-11 (Supp. 1991); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.016(b) (West 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5256 (1991) (bound to
follow as closely as possible the dictates of the document); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.060(2)
(West 1992). See generally Condie, supra note 4, at 119. Condie argues that these provisions "take
most, if not all, of the force out of living wills." IaL He further argues that it may be unconstitu-
tional for physicians to disregard living wills. Id.
99 Condie, supra note 4, at 119. States include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and the District of Co-
lumbia. Id. at n.99.
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ing compensation for medical services;"°° civil liability; °10 criminal lia-
bility; 10 2  disciplinary action for unprofessional conduct;10 3  and
revocation of one's license to practice medicine."° These penalties show
intention on the part of the drafters to ensure that physicians comply.
More states should adopt penalties such as these. These penalties add
validity and legal weight to the declarant's request. The threat to invoke
these penalties will be an effective measure in encouraging physicians to
follow advance directives. Furthermore, the example made of those
against whom penalties are enforced is a good tool in persuading physi-
cians to comply with the terms of advance directives.
6. Immunity From Liability
Prior to the enactment of these statutes, a physician complying with
a declaration could be held liable for murder, manslaughter, aiding sui-
cide, or wrongful death. The statutes, however, provide a "safe harbor"
for these physicians. Every state with a living will statute has a provision
to the effect that:
No physician, licensed health care professional, medical care facility or
employee thereof who in good faith and pursuant to reasonable medi-
cal standards causes or participates in the withholding or withdrawing
of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to a dec-
laration ... shall, as a result thereof, be subject to criminal or civil
liability, or be found to have committed an act of unprofessional
conduct. 105
These provisions are vital in protecting complying physicians. Commen-
tators note, however, that so few homicide cases are reported involving
euthanasia that the provisions may be unnecessary. 106 This argument is
diminished because the potential liability accompanying each case is sub-
100 Alaska is the only state which currently provides for this explicitly in its statute. ALASKA
STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (1991).
101 This does not exceed $1,000 plus actual costs. See e.g., MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 5-607 (1990) (civil liability for professionals, but not for non-professionals).
102 These statutes make it a misdemeanor if the physician fails to record the declaration or to
transfer the patient in the event that he is unwilling to comply. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-209(a)-(b)
(Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 710(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206(1)-(2) (1991).
103 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-113(5) (West 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b) (1989);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 708(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-22
(West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65.28, 107 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.045 (Vernon Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3107 C (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108 (Supp. 1991).
104 TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-11-108 (Supp. 1991).
105 ALA. CODE § 22-8A-7 (1990).
106 Condie, supra note 4, at 120. See also, Carol Dufraine, Living Wills--A Need for Statewide
Legislation or a Federally Recognized Right, 1983 DET. C. L. REV. 781, 820 (1983).
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stantial. The punishment for homicide under most state criminal stat-
utes is great."°7 Further, unlimited civil liability and severe damage to
one's practice renders medical practitioners fearful of implementing liv-
ing will requests.
The recent case of Dr. Jack Kervorkian is illustrative of the poten-
tial penalties that may be ensued. In 1990, a terminally ill patient trav-
elled to Michigan and commited suicide by using a "suicide machine"
invented by Kervorkian, a retired pathologist.10 Dr. Kervorkian was
initially charged with first degree murder, but the charges were dismissed
on the grounds that Michigan had no law against suicide.109 In Septem-
ber of 1991, two other woman committed suicide in the same manner.110
Hearings began in early February, 1992 on whether or not Kervorkian
should stand trial for murder.111  On February 28, 1992, a judge ruled
that Kervorkian will go to trial for two counts of first-degree murder.'1 2
Some physicians may feel that, regardless of whether or not a living
will exists, foregoing life-sustaining treatment may not only run contrary
to their ethical standards, but may also place them at risk for a homicide
conviction. Although a good faith standard may be imposed, the insula-
tion provided by a living will may make the difference, to a physician,
between deciding to comply or refusing to do so.
B. Common Law
1. When Common Law Is Used
As noted above, forty-six jurisdictions currently have legislation di-
rectly addressing the issue of living wills."1 3 However, when statutory
requirements are ambiguous or inapplicable (and in those states which
lack any legislation on point), the common law provides some clarifica-
tion. Courts will look to common law as a guide to how other judges
have treated the issues. The trend is to base decisions squarely on prece-
dent. The Supreme Court stated in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health,"14 that "most state courts have based a right to refuse treatment
on the common law right to informed consent.., or on both that right
and a constitutional privacy right.""1 5 The common law right to have
107 See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Herd 1992) (allowing for the death
penalty in the case of first degree murder.)
1o8 Editorial, THE DESCIPLINING OF DOCTOR DEATH, Nov. 28, 1991, at H10.
109 Id. A bill is pending as of November 28, 1991 to make assisted suicide a felony. Id.
110 Id.
111 20/20: Dr. Kervorkian to Stand Trial (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1992).
112 In Michigan, the crime of first-degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence without
parole. Id.
113 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
114 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
115 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2843, 2846 (1990). See, eg.,
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one's advance declarations carried out was first articulated on a large
scale in Cruzan.
2. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health
Cruzan involved a young woman, age twenty-five, who was ren-
dered incompetent as a result of severe injuries sustained during an auto-
mobile accident.1I 6 Upon learning that she had no chance of recovering
her cognitive faculties," 7 her parents petitioned for a court order di-
recting that Nancy's artificial feeding and hydration equipment be re-
moved." Testimony was presented by a house-mate and co-worker,
who had been a childhood friend, as well as from Nancy's sister, of spe-
cific conversations with Nancy regarding her fate should she ever become
irreversibly comatose." 9 Her guardian ad litem, too, testified that it
would be in her best interest to have the tube feeding discontinued. 20
The Circuit Court, Jasper County [Probate Division] directed that the
guardian's request be carried out.' 2 ' Appeal was taken, however, by her
guardian ad litem because he felt, as a case of first impression in Mis-
souri, the matter should be pursued to the highest state court. 122 In
Cruzan v. Harmon,123 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed; holding
that there was not clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's desire to
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn under such circumstances.' 24
The Supreme Court, in affirming this decision, held that Missouri could
constitutionally apply the clear and convincing evidence standards.' 25
Recently, however, the Missouri courts have reviewed the evidence and
found it to be sufficient to support removal of the tubes.' 26 The probate
judge granted the parents' wish on December 14, 1990127 (at which time
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 84 (N.Y. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass. 1977).
116 Jerry V. McMartin, "Prisoner of Medical Technology"-A Case Comment on Cruzan by
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept of Health, 110 S.CT. 2841 (1990), available in WESTLAW WL
357780, at 1. The accident occurred in 1983. Id.
117 She was in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) defined as "a condition in which 'patients
may react reflexively to sounds, movements and normally painful stimuli, but they do not feel any
pain or sense anybody or anything. Vegetative state patients may appear awake but they are com-
pletely unaware.' "Id. at 1-2, citing Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medi-
cal Reality, 18 HASINGS C-r. REP. 27, 28, 31 (1988).
118 Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2845.
119 Id. at 2846, 2855.
120 Id. at 2863.
121 McMartin, supra note 116, at 3.
122 Id.
123 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
124 Id. at 426-27.
125 Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. 2841.
126 Cruzan v. Mouton, No. CV384-9P (Jasper County P. Ct., Mo. Dec. 14, 1990).
127 Id.
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Nancy was age 33 and had been on life-support apparatus for eight
years). Nancy died twelve days later. 128
3. Constitutional Privacy-Right Controversies Are Not New
Historically, at common law, even nonconsensual touching of an-
other without justification was a battery.129 As the Supreme Court noted
in Cruzan, it had held before the turn of the century that "[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law." 130 The notion of bodily integrity
is essential to the idea of informed consent in medical treatment.1 3 1 Jus-
tice Cardozo noted in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,132
that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his body." 133
4. Right To Refuse Treatment
The right to refuse treatment is central to the idea of a living will. If
a patient is allowed to refuse various other types of medical treatment,
then he should similarly be allowed to refuse treatment which is sus-
taining his life. 134 The earliest significant decision regarding the "right to
die" was In re Quinlan .13 Although this case did not specifically involve
a living will, its result lends theoretical support to living will statutes.
Karen Quinlan suffered severe brain damage, after a "coma of unknown
etiology," 136 and was diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative
state.137 Upon her father's request for judicial approval to disconnect
128 Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1990, at Al.
129 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 5 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39-42
(5th ed. 1984).
130 Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2846. See also, Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891).
131 Cruzan, 110 S.Ct at 2846.
132 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
133 Id.
134 Justice Scalia discusses this in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865.
He states that this right of refusal is a fundamental right: "But if a competent person has a liberty
interest to be free from unwanted medical treatment ... it must be fundamental." Id.
135 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
136 Id. at 655.
137 Id. Persistent vegetative state (or "PVS") describes a "syndrome of diverse etiologies in-
cluding cerebral, cortical, or brainstem legions." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 1981, supra note 5, at
88. Patients in this condition are often described as "awake but not aware: they often can breathe,
chew, swallow and even groan but show no signs of consciousness, perception, cognition, or other
higher functions." Id.
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Karen's respirator, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted relief.138 It
held that Karen had a right of privacy grounded in the Federal Constitu-
tion which allowed her to terminate treatment.13 9 Although the Quinlan
court recognized that the patient's interests must be balanced against the
asserted state interest, the court sided with Karen."4 Despite the fact
that no clear and convincing evidence of Karen's desires existed, the
court was willing to say that she had the right to die.
14 1
5. Right of Informed Consent and the Right to Privacy
This right to refuse treatment, notes Chief Justice Rehnquist in the
Cruzan opinion, parallels the doctrine of informed consent.' 4 2 Following
Quinlan, courts have relied on the right of informed consent and the
privacy right in their analysis of right-to-die cases. 43 In Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,'" the Massachusetts Supreme
Court relied on both rights in permitting chemotherapy to be withheld
from a profoundly retarded 67-year old man suffering from leukemia. 4 '
The patient in Saikewicz was a patient in a state hospital. Because he
was profoundly retarded, he was unable to understand the reason for the
pain that the treatment would cause (physical pain as well as nausea and
vomiting). 4 6 The court applied the substituted judgment test. 147 Rehn-
quist reflects in Cruzan that the seeds of the "substituted judgment"
standard were laid in Saikewicz. 148 The substituted judgment standard,
whereby courts determine what an incompetent's decision would have
been under the circumstances, lends support for the right to die. Living
will legislation avoids the need to rely on the substituted judgment stan-
dard. The standard, however, acts not only as a default measure (where
legislation is lacking) but also illustrates the judicial trend towards al-
lowing a patient to request that life-sustaining treatment be withheld or
withdrawn.
So, Quinlan was a step towards the acceptance of living wils. Four
years later, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the informed con-
sent doctrine while declining to employ the privacy right basis. 49 In In
138 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
139 Id. at 662-64.
140 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
141 Id. at 671-72.
142 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847.
143 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 1365 (2d ed.
1988).
144 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
145 Id. at 424.
146 Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 376 (1988).
147 Id.
148 Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2847. Cf. In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
149 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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re Storar, informed consent was the preferred theory because the patient
(a 52-year-old man suffering from bladder cancer) had been severely re-
tarded for most of his life; thus an attempt to determine what he would
decide concerning his life prolonging treatment if competent was "un-
realistic." 5 ' A companion case, In re Eichner,15 1 moves further towards
a support of advance declarations. The patient, an 83-year-old priest,
suffered a cardiac arrest during surgery and was thereafter in a vegetative
state. His statements, made when competent, to his close friend for
twenty-six years, Father Philip Eichner, were found by the court to be
sufficient evidence that "he did not want to be maintained in a vegetative
coma by use of a respirator."1 52 This is significant because the patient
was allowed to die even in the absence of a written declaration.
6. A More Subjective Standard
Later cases have relied heavily on the approach taken in Quinlan,
Saikewicz, and StorarlEichner. In re Conroy, employed an even more
subjective standard.1 53 In deciding whether a nastrogastric feeding tube
could be removed from an 84-year-old incompetent nursing home resi-
dent with irreversible mental and physical symptoms, the court first held
that self-determination and informed consent were decisive. 154 The court
went on to state that the right of self-determination should not be ig-
nored simply because an incompetent cannot sense its violation.115  Life-
sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn, said the court,
when it is clear that the particular patient would have refused the treat-
ment under the circumstances;156 thus, a subjective standard was im-
posed.15 7  Where such evidence is lacking, the court held that an
individual's right could still be invoked under the more objective "best
interests" standard."5 8
150 Id. at 72.
151 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
152 Id. at 72.
153 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The subjective standard involved seeking to
determine what that particular patient would have wanted under the circumstances not what the
reasonable person would have done. Id.
154 md2 at 1225-1226.
15 Id. at 1237.
156 Id. at 1229.
157 Id. Although Conroy held that the evidence in the instant case did not meet all the tests for
termination of life-sustaining treatment, the case's significance lies in the fact that it recognized a
subjective standard, as opposed to the more objective, reasonable person standard.
158 Id. at 1229-1233. The court mentions the possibility of the patient's having expressed "in
one or more ways" an intent not to have life-sustaining medical intervention. Id. at 1229. A "living
will," one vehicle for expressing such intent, was not legally binding in New Jersey at the time of the
decision (the New Jersey legislature has not enacted a statute). The court cited John F Kennedy
Memorial Hosp., Inc v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984), for the proposition that
"[w]hether or not they are legally binding, however, such advance directives are relevant evidence of
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7. The "Best Interests" Test
The best interests test is illustrated in the case of In re Dinner-
stein ," The family and physician of Shirley Dinnerstein, a 67-year-old
woman hospitalized with severe Alzheimer's disease, petitioned the court
for a ruling on the legality of entering a "no-code" (do-not-resuscitate or
"DNR") order on her medical chart.16 Using the straight best interests
test, the Court held the DNR order permissible in light of her hopeless
condition. 161 Thus, in Dinnerstein and Conroy, even though no evidence
of the patient's desires was available, the courts held that life-sustaining
measures could be terminated.1 62 In analyzing the judicial treatment of
living wills, this point is significant. If courts are willing to accept an
even lower evidentiary standard, they may be quick to accept written
proof of intent, as contained in a living will.
8. States Which Lack a Common Law Response
There remain, however, a few states which have yet to see litigation
concerning living wills. As of August 31, 1991, the right to die issue had
not been litigated in only two states. 163 As we have seen, the dicta state-
ments in In re Conroy provide insight into the court's probable treatment
of the issue. 64 In re Severns, 16 5 provides further insight. Not only was
evidence introduced that the patient had often expressed the ardent hope
that she would never be kept alive in a vegetative state, but it was sup-
ported by proof that she had proposed to her husband that they execute
living wills.1 66 In light of this obvious intent, the court ruled that the
the patient's intent." Id. at 1229 n.5. After listing other vehicles (i.e. durable power of attorney,
appointed proxy, evidence of oral directive, or deduction based on religious beliefs) the court stated,
"[o]f course, dealing with the matter in advance in some sort of thoughtful and explicit way is best
for all concerned." Id. at 1229-1230.
159 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
160 Id. at 135. The court refers to "no code" as meaning order not to resusitate or "ONTR."
Id. at 136.
161 Id. at 139.
162 Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1241-44 (outlining a procedure to be followed in determining whether
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an elderly nursing home resident who is
incompetent); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d at 139 (concluding that in certain situations, a DNR
order will be acceptable).
163 See MEISEL, supra note 21, at 1-I1. The States are Kentucky and South Dakota. Note
that six jurisdictions have not enacted living will legislation. These states include: Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island. See supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text.
164 See supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text. See also Lobe, supra note 7, at 76. The
court's reference to living wills occurs in the context of substitute decision-making. Thus it remains
unclear whether New Jersey would enforce such a directive if the incompetent's guardian or next of
kin were not making the treatment decision. Id.
165 425 A.2d 156 (Del. 1980).
166 Id. at 158.
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patient's husband could exercise her right to refuse artificial life
support.167
Courts in Massachusetts, 161 Ohio, 1 6 9 and Minnesota 7 ' have author-
ized a substituted decision-maker to withdraw life-sustaining procedures
from an incompetent patient in certain circumstances. Pennsylvania has
no case law addressing an incompetent patient's right to refuse treat-
ment, but an analogous case was decided in the district court in 1973.171
Mrs. Yetter, a schizophrenic, was committed to a mental hospital after
having refused to consent to cancer surgery. Her brother petitioned for a
court-appointed guardian to impose consent to the surgery. In refusing
to appoint a guardian, the court held that she was competent at the time
of refusal. It held that a competent person has the right to refuse to
accept medical treatment that may prolong life.
172
In New York, the issue of the enforceabiliity of living wills was ad-
dressed before the state had passed applicable legislation. A 70-year-old
woman suffering from emphysema and cancer petitioned the court to de-
termine whether her living will would be valid. The document had been
prepared with the help of her attorney. 173 Although the court refused to
declare living wills legally binding, it found the document analogous to
an "informed consent medical statement."' 74 Thus, the document pro-
vides clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent, and should be
given great weight by physicians and hospital authorities in decision-
making. 175 Going further, the court stated that the physicians and hospi-
tals acting in good faith would be immune from both civil and criminal
167 Id. at 160.
168 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986) (relying on testimony
of several informal declarations made by the patient prior to his incompetency in allowing substitute
decision maker to withdraw treatment if she determines that this is what the patient would have
wanted). See also In re Spring, 405 N.E. 2nd 116 and Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417.
169 Leach v. Akron Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (1985). Mrs. Leach expressed a desire to
avoid life-sustaining treatment, even so close as two days before she was admitted. She said, "That's
the one thing that terrifies me. I don't want to be put on life support systems. I don't want to live if I
have to be a vegetable." Id. at 811. See also Lobe, supra note 7, at 78 (noting that Ohio's acceptance
of this oral expression is good evidence that it would most likely accept a formal, written
declaration).
170 In re Torres, 357 N.W. 2d 332, 335 (Minn. 1984) (upholding appointment of conservator to
remove life-sustaining treatment based on (1) evidence of conversation with cousin regarding respira-
tors and (2) best friend's testimony concerning patient's unwillingness to wear a pacemaker).
171 In re Maida Yetter, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973).
172 Id. at 623. Although the case discusses refusal of surgery, it establishes a patient's right to
choose a course of action which may result in death.
173 Saunders v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1985). Note that no state requires that a
living will be prepared by, or with the help of, an attorney.
174 Id. at 516.
175 Id, at 517.
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liability in "honoring the patient's desires." 176
9. Significance of Evidence of Intent
Obviously, the case for living wills can be based upon the notion
that more evidence of intent is better than less. Courts find it easier to
approve removal or withholding of life-sustaining procedures when tan-
gible expression of the patient's desires, prior to incompetency, is avail-
able. Perhaps the decisions seem more justified. Perhaps the courts feel
that the margin for error is reduced proportionately to the amount of
evidence available. Patients who have clearly expressed their desires con-
cerning removal of life-sustaining measures are less likely, in general, to
seek to hold a complying physician liable; and physicians with more evi-
dence of the patient's request can more easily rebut a claim for liability.
Although oral evidence is sometimes held to be sufficient, error in inter-
pretation or failure to recall the conversation exactly may make courts
hesitant to rely on such evidence. A written directive, on the other hand,
reduces the possibility of ambiguity or misinterpretation. The Supreme
Court, in dicta in the recent Cruzan decision, highlighted this issue. 177
The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Westchester County Medical
Center on Behalf of O'Connor,178 refused to accept less than the clearly
expressed wishes of a patient before permitting the exercise of the right to
refuse treatment by a surrogate decision maker." 9 Living wills, in this
author's view, constitute clearly expressed documentation of the patient's
desires.
IV. STATUS IN CANADA
A. Contrast to the United States
In sharp contrast to the United States, which has both a statutory
and common law framework on point, the treatment of living wills in
176 Id. See Lobe, supra note 7, at 77:
"[t]he court in Saunders, without expressly declaring the enforceability if living wills, went
far in ensuring their effectiveness beyond the substituted judgment context by directing
that they be given great weight, by not requiring judicial proceedings prior to their imple-
mentation, and by providing immunity for those who comply with their instructions."
177 Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, notes, for example, that "these procedures for surro-
gate decision-making, which appear to be rapidly gaining in acceptance, may be a valuable addi-
tional safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2858.
178 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
179 The court granted an order to insert a feeding tube into a 77-year-old woman who was
incompetent as a result of several strokes. The court rejected the notion that any person or court
should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another. "[W]e
adhere to the view that, despite its pitfalls and inevitable uncertainties, the inquiry must always be
narrowed to the patient's expressed intent, with every effort to minimize the opportunity for error."
Id. at 613.
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Canada is scarce. The question of validity of living wills simply has not
arisen in the courts. Thus, there is no present statutory framework and
little, if any, common law response. One author, noting this lack of pre-
cedent, states, "neither civil nor criminal law has imposed a duty upon
the physician to furnish treatment that offers no reasonable hope of bene-
fit to the mentally incompetent patient. The law's silence is thus inter-
preted by the medical profession as the law's acquiescence in the practice
of passive nonvoluntary euthanasia."1 "0 In its Report 20: "Euthanasia,
Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment" (a discussion of Working
Paper 28), the Law Reform Commission of Canada (hereinafter
"LRCC") acknowledged that Canadian physicians daily "pun the plug"
on incompetent patients." 1 The LRCC went on to comment:
Many people believe there is no longer any problem: the practice is
legal because it exists, because it occurs every day, and because the law
has never seen fit to intervene. The law's silence is thus interpreted as
an endorsement or tacit consent on its part. 18 2
Sneiderman's assertion that Canada, in effect, follows U.S. precedent in
an unspoken law of acceptance of living wills is quite valid. He points
out that a Canadian court faced with a petition by an incompetent pa-
tient's family demanding life-prolonging treatment be terminated would
most likely grant the petition on two grounds: 1) the common law right,
or 2) a constitutional right.1" 3 Under the common law right, the court
would rule under Eichner that an incompetent patient, in the same man-
ner as a competent patient, has a common law right to cessation of non-
beneficial life support measures.18 4 This reliance on a common law right
is significant in light of the absolute lack of judicial precedent available
across the provinces. The issues of a right to die and the right to rely on
an advance directive simply have not been addressed in Canadian courts.
The constitutional right has more support. To support the constitu-
tional right, Sneiderman notes, the court could trace the right to protec-
tion outlined in § 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.18 5
This section deals explicitly with the "security of the person."186 This
decision would parallel the Quinlan decision's holding of a constitutional
privacy right. In discussing the Canadian response to advance directives,
then, both common law and statutory response is minimal.
180 SNEIDERMAN, supra note 17, at 321.
181 Id. at 324.
182 Id. at 324-325.
183 Id. at 330. Sneiderman assumes that there is sufficient evidence to satisfy either the substi-
tuted judgment or best interests standard. Id.
184 Id.
185 CAN. CONST. (Constitutional Act, 1982) sched. B, pt. I, § 7 [hereinafter CANADIAN
CHARTER].
186 See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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B. Rights Paralleling U.S. Constitutional Rights
As noted above, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms pro-
vision dealing with the security of the person closely parallels provisions
found in the American Bill of Rights. The Canadian Charter reads:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the prin-
ciples of fundamental justice.18 7
This Charter exists as a part of the Canadian Constitution, which was
originally enacted in 1867 under the popular name of The British North
American Act, 1867.181 In addition to this Charter, Canada also has a
bill of rights which was adopted in 1960.189 The Canadian Bill of Rights,
in language almost identical to that contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, outlines the human rights and
fundamental freedoms relating to "the right of the individual to life, lib-
erty, security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the rights not
to be deprived thereof except by due process of law."'190
The language in both the Charter and the Bill of Rights mentions
"security of the person." This phrase can be interpreted to mean the
right to live a life free of restraint or interference by others, which would
offer a great deal of support for living will justifications. In addition the
phrase could literally be taken to mean security to control one's body.
Taken a step further, security would include the decision to undergo or
to abstain from certain medical procedures. Case law in the United
States has incorporated these ideas into the theories of informed consent.
Under cases such as In re Quinlan, Superintendent of Belchertown State
School, and StorarlEichner, American courts have illustrated that the
notions of privacy right and bodily integrity, as extracted from the Four-
teenth Amendment, are still vital and, some argue, should be protected
vehemently. '9'
In the alternative, the phrase "right to life" might encompass the
right to decide when that life shall be terminated. The right to death
theory encounters political problems in the United States - as illus-
187 CANADIAN CHARTER, supra note 185.
188 See generally R.S.C. 1985, appendices No. 44.
189 THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS (1960).
190 Id. pt. I, § l(a) (1960). The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Note the similarity of the language.
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868.
191 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981); In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64
(1981).
Vol. 24:435
LIVING WILLS IN THE U.S: AND CANADA
trated by the hotly contested abortion cases. 192 Those cases involve the
balancing between an individual's right to make determinations concern-
ing one's own body and the state's interest in preserving human life. The
abortion issue, however, is not so controversial in Canada. Because the
Canadian Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights each contain right to
death justifications, they support the notion of living wills.
C. Common Law Rights
Because judicial authority in the area of living wills is nearly non-
existent in Canada, those with vested interests - physicians, health care
practitioners, patients, and families - rely primarily on American case
law. There are, however, a few Canadian cases which merit discussion.
1. Two Leading Cases
Two frequently quoted Canadian cases in right to refuse medical
treatment discussions are Mulloy v. Hop Sang,193 and Marshall v.
Curry,194 Both of these cases, which continue to be cited as controlling
authority, were decided in the 1930's. Today, sixty years later, the Cana-
dian provinces continue to rely on these decisions. The fact that, in this
vast time period, neither case has been overruled or that more recent
precedent has not been set is significant. The case law in Canada con-
cerning right to die issues generally and living wills specifically is
minimal.
2. Medical Necessity Versus Patient's Rights
Mulloy illustrates that a doctor's ethical and legal duties may con-
flict. The patient in that case sought a physician's care in tending to a
post-car accident hand injury. Although the patient repeatedly ex-
pressed his desire that the hand not be amputated, the physician found it
was "necessary" and performed the amputation. 19 The court found that
the operation was necessary and performed in a highly satisfactory man-
ner and consequently, reduced the patient's claim for damages to fifty
dollars. 196 Strikingly, a discussion of the patient's rights was absent from
the opinion. At first glance, this opinion does not appear to support the
theoretical underpinnings of advance directives. Clearly, the physician's
view was accepted as superior in this particular emergency situation. 197
192 See Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490
(1989).
193 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. C.A. 1935).
194 3 D.L.R. 260, 274 (Can. 1933).
195 Mulloy, I W.W.R at 716.
196 Id
197 Id
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Does the lack of emphasis placed on the patient's wishes preclude apply-
ing this case in support of living wills? No, it does not. In this situation,
the patient would continue to live with or without his hand. So this was
not a controversy concerning the final disposition of his body upon a life-
threatening occurrence. Further, the patient seemingly had not had the
opportunity to comment on or to request what should be done if such a
car accident occurred. Because of these distinguishing points, Mulloy
does not directly destroy support for living wills.
3. Recognition of the Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
The court in Marshall, however, recognized the patient's right to
refuse medical treatment.19 The patient brought suit against his physi-
cian who, upon surgery to cure a hernia, removed the patient's left testi-
cle.199 The court held, "[a] person's body must be held inviolate and
immune from invasion by the surgeon's knife, if an operation is not con-
sented to."2"° Consent, or lack thereof, thus becomes a pivotal issue in
this case, much the same as it did in the substituted judgment cases dis-
cussed above. Marshall, a Canadian Supreme Court case, adds signifi-
cant weight to the argument because it was decided by the highest court
and is thus controlling authority in all provinces. So, Canadian patients,
despite a lack of appropriate case law, should be allowed to maintain
bodily integrity.
D. The Criminal Code Trap
Alongside this lack of judicial authority concerning living wills or
the right to die is the Canadian Criminal Code's threatening venire of
sanctions for physicians aiding in the process of suicide or omitting the
performance of reasonable medical procedures. In the United States, in-
dividual states maintain authority to legislate in the criminal area.z0 l In
Canada, however, the "residuary powers" rest with the national
government.2 °2
The Criminal Code provisions could present a threat to physicians.
Hypothetically, the Crown prosecutor could bring claims against a physi-
cian participating in the withholding of life-prolonging treatment under a
203number of Criminal Code provisions. In reality, however, the number
198 Marshall, 3 D.L.R. at 274.
199 Id. at 260.
200 Id.
201 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
202 John Stephens, The Right to Die, I LEGAL MED. Q. 111 (1977).
203 These include: R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, § 217 (stating that every one who undertakes to do an
act is under a legal duty to do it if the omission is or may be dangerous to life); id., c.C-46, § 216
(one undertaking to administer surgical medical procedure must use reasonable care and knowledge
- except in the case of a necessity); id., c.C-46, § 229 (culpable homicide is murder when a person
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of cases prosecuted under the Criminal Code is negligible.2 '4
E. LRCC Recommendations
As in the United States, there have been significant changes in Cana-
dian medical technology and related medical treatment in the past few
decades. These changes have occurred since the relevant Code provi-
sions were first enacted.20 5 The Criminal Code, however, has not been
amended to reflect these medical and societal changes. According to the
LRCC, "sophisticated and scientific palliative care was either unknown
or at best in its infancy,"2 °6 at the time of drafting. The Commission
notes that not only are some of these provisions obsolete, but they are
also plagued with ambiguity.2"7 The LRCC thus recommends
208revision.
Report 20 analyzed the proposed reform contained in three basic
areas: (1) voluntary euthanasia and mercy killing, (2) aiding suicide, and
(3) cessation and refusal of treatment.20 9 First, the Commission con-
cluded that active euthanasia should not be legalized.21 0 This is in ac-
cordance with the United State's inherent ban on active euthanasia.21
Second, it pointed out that aiding suicide should not be decriminal-
ized. 212 This is reflected in several of the state criminal statutes in the
United States.21 3 Third, the Commission held that the Criminal Code
should clearly express that a physician cannot be held criminally liable
who causes the death of a human being means to cause his death); or id., c.C-46 § 241 (everyone
who counsels or procures a person to commit suicide or aids and abets a person is guilty of an
indictable offence.)
204 See SNEIDERMAN, supra note 17, at 324-325. Suicide is not a crime, but under R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46 § 14, "No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on him, and such
consent does not affect the criminal responsibility of any person by whom death may be inflicted on
the person by whom consent is given."
205 This change in circumstances, however, is meant to reflect the original draft of these code
provisions which was in 1970
206 LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT 20: EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE
AND CESSATION OF TREATMENT 9 (1983) [hereinafter REPORT 20]. See also supra notes 2-6 and
accompanying text. Palliative care is defined as care which "makes less severe, without curing;
[which] reduce[s] the pain or intensity of; [which] mitigates." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 945 (New College ed. 1980).
207 REPORT 20, supra note 205, at 9.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 17-28.
210 Id. at 17. The reasoning behind this recommendation is focused on the potential for abuse,
the thought that it would indirectly condone murder, and the fact that the Commission believed it
would be morally unacceptable to the majority of Canadian people to legalize active euthanasia. Id.
at 18.
211 See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
212 REPORT 20, supra note 205, at 21. The Commission noted that R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 § 241
should be retained in its present form. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
213 For example, the New York Statute states "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide at-
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"merely" for undertaking or continuing palliative care.2 14 Note that one
of the aims of most state living wills statutes in the United States is the
protection of physicians from liability.215 This measure of protection en-
courages physicians to comply with advance directives.216 The Commis-
sion also opined that treatment "should never be imposed against a
person's will."2"7 In its most supportive conjecture of living wills, the
Commission recommends that physicians not incur criminal liability in
the event they discontinue or fail to commence treatment for an incom-
petent when the treatment is no longer "therapeutically useful and in the
patient's best interests."2 8 The distinction between treatment which is
therapeutically useful and that which is not is sometimes blurry. Thera-
peutically useful treatment offers some benefit to the patient, be it com-
fort or some level of healing.21 9 If treatment is not therapeutically useful,
the patient will not benefit from the treatment in any way.22 In allowing
this distinction to be made, the recommendations of the LRCC run con-
trary to the Canadian Criminal Code. The Criminal Code strictly pro-
hibits termination of treatment under various provisions. 221 As the
Commission suggests, change is badly needed. LRCC in Working Paper
28, while maintaining a presumption in favor of life,222 held that the pa-
tient's autonomy and right to "self-determination" are crucial.223
F Evidence of Trend Toward Acceptance of Living Wills
One Canadian commentator is convinced that the LRCC, support-
ing the substituted judgment and best interests tests, is leaning toward
acceptance of advance declarations.224 The 1983 Commission stated that
tempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. Promoting suicide is a
class E felony." N.Y.PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987).
214 REPORT 20, supra note 206, at 23.
215 See supra notes 8 & 98 and accompanying text.
216 See supra sections A5 and A6.
217 REPORT 20, supra note 206, at 22. The physician, further, is under a duty to inform the
patient of his options and their various consequences. Id. These suggestions closely parallel the
suggested need to ensure that American patients keep intact their constitutional rights of privacy
and bodily integrity. See supra section A5. Relatedly, the Canadian Bill of Rights provides in part I:
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue
to exist ... the following human rights ... (a) the right to life, liberty, security of the
person ... and the right not to be deprived thereof except by due process of law.
Cynthia A. Baker, The Living Will: The Final Expression, 4 LEGAL MED. Q. 2, 11 (1980). (quoting
from the Canadian Bill of Rights).
218 REPORT 20, supra note 206, at 27-28.
219 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
220 Id.
221 See supra notes 203-04.
222 REPORT 20, supra note 206, at 11.
223 Id. at 11-12.
224 See SNEIDERMAN, supra note 17, at 322-323 & 328-330.
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decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment should be "based upon the
wishes of the person prior to becoming incompetent, or upon his best inter-
ests determined by others. ' 225 Sneiderman further points out that "the
purpose of the law is to grant authority to the patient, through the mech-
anism of the living will. '226 The mere fact that the LRCC identified and
has begun to discuss the pros and cons of living will legislation in light of
Canada's previous trend to ignore the subject entirely is promising.
Further evidence of this trend can be seen in a 1977 Private Mem-
bers Bill, the Natural Death Act, concerning the living will. This bill,
upon introduction in the Ontario legislature, never progressed beyond its
first reading.227 A local election intervened. 22 A similar bill was intro-
duped in the Alberta legislature in the same year, which too was defeated
after first reading. Between 1977 and 1990, it appears that no additional
legislation concerning living wills was introduced in any of the provincial
legislatures. In April, 1990, however, two new proposals were intro-
duced in the Ontario legislature. The first, entitled, The Natural Death
Act, 1990 declared its purpose to be the recognition of an adult person's
right to "make a written declaration (living will) that instructs a physi-
cian or other health-care provider to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures in the event of a terminal condition. 2 29 The Bill,
presented by Mr. Norman Sterling on April 3, 1990, has not yet been
definitively voted upon, and research yields no evidence of proceedings or
related debates on the bill. The second bill, also presented by Mr. Ster-
ling, entitled The Powers of Attorney Amendment Act, 1990230 is pur-
ported to "provide for a durable power of attorney with respect to
consent and withdrawal of consent to medical treatment. 231
Both bills are succinct and straightforward. The Powers of Attor-
ney Amendment Act is a proposed amendment to § 5 of chapter 386 of
the Revised Statutes of Ontario (1980). It seeks the addition of the fol-
lowing language:
(2) A provision in a power of attorney may authorize another person
to give consent or directions respecting, (a) the medical treatment of
the person giving the authorization; or (b) the withdrawal of medical
treatment for the person giving the authorization.232
Section (b), because it focuses on withdrawal of medical treatment, is of
225 Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
226 Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
227 Tom Campbell, Euthanasia and the Law, 17 ALBERTA L. REV. 188, 200 (1979). The Bill
was modeled after the California statute. Id.
228 The minority Progressive Conservative government was defeated in April, 1977. Id.
229 NATURAL DEATH AcT, 1990, explanatory note.
230 POWERS OF ATrORNEY AMENDMENT AcT, 1990.
231 Id. explanatory note.
232 Id. (emphasis added).
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great interest. Not only does the bill state that the appointed person has
authority to make decisions regarding medical treatment in general, but
it specifically addresses the issue of treatment termination. This portion
of the bill closely reflects the durable power of attorney provision found
in the California state statute.233 Both allow an appointed individual to
make decisions concerning termination of treatment.234 Both provisions,
however, leave open the question of who has decision-making authority
in the event that no proxy is appointed.
The Natural Death Act, on the other hand, sets forth two important
goals. First, it seeks to protect physicians who withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining procedures in accordance with a patient's wishes (under a
living will) from civil liability and disciplinary action.235 Second, the bill
attempts to impose penalties on physicians and health-care providers
who refuse to follow the living will and, relatedly, refuses to make "rea-
sonable efforts to transfer the patient to another physician or health care
provider" willing to do so. 236 In general, this bill appears identical in
substance and form to the majority of state living will statutes. It con-
tains a definition section. 237  Further, it requires certain formalities in
execution.238 Parallel to the United States' statutes, witnesses cannot be
related to the declarant, or be a potential beneficiary to the declarant's
estate.239 Like most U.S. statutes, the proposal negates a living will's
validity while the declarant is pregnant. 240 Lastly, the proposal contains
specific requirements for revocation.241 In the final analysis, these two
very recently proposed bills provide evidence of concrete support among
233 See generally SOcIETY HANDBOOK, supra note 13. See also supra note 12 and accompany-
ing text.
234 See supra note 17; POWERS OF ATTORNEY AMENDMENT AcT, 1990, explanatory note.
235 Again, this proposal, like that in Working Paper 20, and the "immunity from liability"
provisions in most state statutes, seeks to protect physicians and encourage compliance. See supra
section A6 (Immunity from Liability).
236 The addition of this proposed provision is significant. Prior to this proposal, Canadian
reform has lacked a provision for imposition of penalties for physician non-compliance. A great
number of U.S. state statutes, however, contain non-compliance provisions. See supra Section A5
(Noncompliance). Thus the addition of this provision further bridges the gap between the U.S.
system of living wills laws and the developing Canadian response.
237 See supra Section A3 (Definition Section).
238 See supra Section A2 (Execution Formalities). The formalities state that the living will
must: be in writing; signed by the declarant in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the
same time; signed by these witnesses in the presence of the declarant; and properly dated.
239 See supra Section A2 (Execution Formalities).
240 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
241 See supra Section A4 (Revocation Procedures). The proposal's revocation procedures, like
most U.S. statutes, appear testamentary in nature. Thus a declarant must: destroy, deface or direct
another to destroy or deface the document; prepare a written revocation; or orally revoke with con-
veyed intent to do so.
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Canadian law-makers that living will acceptance is becoming more of a
reality in Canada.
The discussion is incomplete, however, without some mention of the
hesitation felt by those opposing statutory acceptance of living wills in
Canada. The LRCC, in its 1984 report, cautioned against the enactment
of living will legislation. It said: "We believe that it would risk the rever-
sal of the already - established rule that there should be no duty to
initiate or maintain treatment when it is useless to do so." 42 This state-
ment, however, can be easily refuted. As we have seen, Canada generally
follows U.S. precedent in an unspoken manner. Living will legislation, in
creating clear-cut guidelines, would help to remedy existing ambiguities
among health care practitioners and potential declarant alike.
G. Health Care/Insurance in Canada
In advising Canadian provinces as to which legislative provisions
they should adopt concerning living wills, major differences between the
two countries must be considered. One major systematic difference is
that of health care coverage. The United States, for the most part, has a
system of non-socialized health insurance coverage. 43 Aside from Medi-
caid and Medicare, the majority of Americans are responsible for fund-
ing their own routine and emergency medical needs. By setting aside a
portion of their earnings, or by taking into consideration contributions
made by their employers, U.S. citizens are able to fund necessary health
insurance.' 4 With some limitations, Americans are free to chose their
physicians and health care facilities.245 Because Americans are, for the
most part, financially responsible for their medical treatment and related
insurance costs, they demand to play a significant role in deciding to
terminate treatment.246 Should a physician fail to comply with his con-
tractual obligation to carry out an advance directive, Americans have
available to them the remedy of civil suit." 7
Canadian patients, similarly, are able to chose the doctor and the
hospital they desire for their health care treatment.24 Unlike other "so-
242 SNEIDERMAN, supra note 17, at 328.
243 See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 1-40 (1990) (providing
an introduction to health care delivery in the United States).
244 Id.
245 These include financial constraints, emergency situations (where medical necessity requires
an individual to be taken to the nearest hospital and to have the attending physician render emer-
gency procedures), or choice restrictions set by individual health insurance plans. An H.M.O., for
example, while providing inexpensive health care coverage, may require the patient to chose from a
limited pool of physicians.
246 ANNAS, supra note 243.
247 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
248 RozOvsKy, supra note 9, at 13.
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cialized" systems of health care, Canada's is based on the "free-enterprise
system."249 Budget restrictions are the most significant limitation placed
upon hospitals by the federal government in Canada.250 Thus, as Rozov-
sky notes, "the effect of this system on patient's rights is that the rights
against a doctor or hospital concerning treatment and care do not effect
the patient's rights to insurance for those services, and vice versa. ' 1
Withholding payment for medical bills is therefore not an effective threat
to physicians who refuse to comply with living wills, as the government
pays the bills.252 Criminal liability (for aiding suicide under the Criminal
Code, for example), however, becomes a more threatening potential
under a system such as this because the government has a stronger hand
in the day-to-day interaction between doctor and patient.
Health care coverage in Canada is based on residence.253 This con-
cept is misleading, however, because if a Canadian citizen is considered a
resident of a province for coverage purposes, he is eligible for world-wide
coverage.25a The province where the patient created the living will is
thus a significant factor. As with the United States, however, controver-
sies will certainly arise concerning what the statute in the jurisdiction
where the medical care is rendered will allow - that statute potentially
conflicting with the statute enacted in the patient's "residential" prov-
ince. Suggestions that Canada seek to enact uniform statutes, under this
analysis, carry a great deal of weight.
H. US. State Living Will Statutes as Models
Encouraging Canadian legislators to enact living wills laws is a bold
move. The trend towards acceptance of living wills has gained increased
momentum in the past few years. Simply suggesting the Canadians
would benefit if living wills laws were enacted does not solve the prob-
lem. Canadian legislators need more guidance. They need concrete ex-
amples of which provisions will be effective in the unique social and
political arena found in Canadian provinces. Unfortunately, no true con-
sensus has been established in the United States regarding which are the
most effective provisions, or which provisions absolutely should not be
employed in setting up new statutes.255
249 Id. at 10.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 11.
252 Id. at 21
253 Id. at 12.
254 Id. at 13.
255 One example of a provision which Canadian provinces should not employ is that of auto-
matic revocation. Requiring that a living will be re-executed every five years will potentially mean
that people intending to have enforceable living wills will inadvertently allow them to lapse. See
supra, note 92.
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1. Standard Form of Statute
One suggestion, however, is immediately apparent from a study of
the U.S. state statutory scheme. Canada should attempt to make the stat-
utory enactments throughout the provinces nearly identical in form and
language. This would alleviate much of the ongoing confusion which
stems from the great variety of individual state statutes in the United
States. Physicians (or others asked to carry out the directives) and pa-
tients (or those wishing to make or enforce a living will) would more
easily be able to interpret or enforce advance directives if all jurisdictions
had the same requirements for creation, enforceability, and revocation of
living wills. Ensuring, too, that the language of the statutes is similar
would alleviate much of the interpretive controversies which presently
plague the medical arena in the U.S.
Initially patients would not hesitate to create living wills if the re-
quirements and limitations of such devices were spelled out in an under-
standable and consistent manner. Physicians would more easily feel
justified in following advance directives if the statutes treated their re-
quired role and their potential liability for noncompliance in a direct and
uniform manner. Squabbles over which state (or Provincial) statute ap-
plies in a particular instance would be virtually nonexistent because all
provincial statutes would contain the same provisions.
2. Requirement of Standard Form of Living Will
Even if the provincially oriented political climate in Canada pre-
cludes the enactment of identical statutes across the provinces, ensuring
that all statutes, regardless of their wording, require a standard living
will form to be used by those making advance directives will put an end
to many of the problems noted above. Health-care providers could make
decisions concerning whether or not to follow a directive with ease. The
origin of the directive, or whether or not the patient resided in a particu-
lar province would no longer be significant issues since a living will could
be deemed valid or invalid immediately simply by ascertaining whether
or not it complies with the standard form. Requiring any patient wishing
to create a living will to follow a standard form would not only help to
eliminate problems of interpretation at the enforcement level, but it
would also wipe away some of the veil of mystery and intimidation that
those patients might encounter if various forms were allowed.
3. Allowing Flexibility?
Aside from the possibilities of enacting a uniform statute or requir-
ing that a standard form be used in creating living wills, should the prov-
inces allow flexibility for those following the statutes? The U.S. state
statutes vary greatly on this issue - some require that the form laid out
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in the statute be followed exactly,25 6 while others have a rather vague
form and allow for individual patients to add provisions as they see fit.2" 7
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. Those po-
tentially interested in creating a living will may shy away from doing so if
the statute they are guided by contains inflexible instructions regarding
the provisions to be contained in their advance directive. Others may feel
comfort in having all provisions spelled out for them, leaving them with
fewer ambiguous questions to mull over as they contemplate making a
living will. Certainly, at the enforcement level, statutes such as the Ore-
gon example provide added comfort health care providers making the
decision whether or not to comply with a directive. This is because the
potential for miscommunication is greater under statutes, such as the
Connecticut statute, which "permit personalized additions and directions
as to treatment. '25
8
V. CONCLUSION
A great deal of ambiguity exists in Canada surrounding the issue of
living wills. Patients and physicians have no static authority to which
they can refer regarding the validity of advance directives. This ambigu-
ity must be eliminated.
Although Canadian physicians may rely on American norms as il-
lustrated through our case law and statutory standards, this is a shaky
and potentially disastrous practice. Canadian physicians are not guaran-
teed that they will be deemed to be acting lawfully under Canadian stan-
dards. There remains the potential for criminal liability under the
Criminal Code, as well as unlimited civil liability. Medical practitioners
need some standard by which they can competently continue to follow
advance directives without being fearful of this potential liability or the
omnipresent threat of conviction. What exists today in Canada is only a
system of accepted norms. But who is to say that these norms will not be
contradicted by a particularly zealous judge? Although passive euthana-
sia cases are rarely prosecuted, the possibility of a conviction is not yet
extinct.
The Canadian health care system poses an additional dilemma for
physicians. Under its socialized style of health care insurance, based pri-
marily on residence for qualification, not all hospitals and medical serv-
ices are insured. 259 Thus a physician faces the prospect that his services
256 See e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.610(1) (1991), which states that "The directive shall be in
the following form .. "
257 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-575 (West 1991) (stating that "any adult person
may execute a document in substantially the following form"). See also UNIFORM RIGHTS ACT,
supra note 18, § 2.
258 SocIETY HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 19.
259 RozovsKy, supra note 9, at 10-21.
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will be rejected for reimbursement under the provincial plans should he
comply with a living will that is not (under case law or statute) legally
binding. Canadian physicians, then, may be frightened into non-compli-
ance. This possibility must be precluded.
There remain several unresolved issues regarding which specific pro-
visions the provinces should adopt. These issues, however, are periph-
eral. Although they must be addressed, the important matter at this
point is putting some sort of statutory framework into place. In order to
maintain its comforting status quo, Canada must enact a statutory solu-
tion to the puzzle involving living wills. It cannot continue to look over
the border and silently imitate the U.S. solution. For, as we have seen
the United States still faces some inconsistencies and limitations.
What we must remember amidst all the confusion is that the notion
behind the living will is a noble one: that each person should have the
choice to accept or to refuse medical treatment. This notion is rooted in
ethical, moral, constitutional, and now legal concepts and it is undenia-
bly a right which should be protected for Americans and Canadians
alike.
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